Reserved Seats on Japan\u27s Supreme Court by Repeta, Lawrence
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 88 
Issue 6 Decision Making on the Japanese Supreme Court 
2011 
Reserved Seats on Japan's Supreme Court 
Lawrence Repeta 
Meiji University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Courts Commons, and the Judges Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lawrence Repeta, Reserved Seats on Japan's Supreme Court, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1713 (2011). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/14 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1713 
RESERVED SEATS ON JAPAN’S  
SUPREME COURT 
LAWRENCE REPETA

 
INTRODUCTION 
The first Supreme Court appointed under Japan’s present Constitution 
took office in August 1947. This was during an early stage of the 
country’s occupation by Allied military forces, just two years from the end 
of the Great War. The Court was appointed a few months after Japan 
adopted a revolutionary Constitution that transferred sovereignty from the 
Emperor to the Japanese people and began to implement numerous legal 
reforms crafted to conform to the new order.  
As the final arbiter of disputes to arise under this Constitution and these 
laws, the Supreme Court would play a role of incalculable importance in 
Japan’s evolution as a democratic society. Key features of the Court’s 
structure were defined by the new Constitution and Courts Act, each of 
which took effect on May 3, 1947.  
Foreign students of Japan’s Supreme Court are inevitably drawn to a 
series of customs surrounding appointments to the Court that are not 
prescribed by the Constitution, the Courts Act, or any other formal law. 
The first is the custom of total secrecy that surrounds the process. The 
Japanese people learn little about the individuals selected to serve on the 
Court and learn the identities of new Justices only after appointments are 
finalized by Cabinet Order. Another custom is the general limitation of 
appointments to individuals of relatively advanced age. With few 
exceptions, appointees are at least sixty-four years old. Because the Courts 
Act requires that all Justices retire by the age of seventy, individual 
Justices tend to have relatively short terms of service.  
But one might argue that the most distinctive custom is the practice of 
allocating a relatively fixed number of seats to candidates from different 
segments of the legal community. Foreign observers use terms like ―vested 
right,‖1 ―quota,‖2 and ―well-established patterns of selection‖3 to describe 
 
 
  Professor, Meiji University, Faculty of Law. 
 1. HIROSHI ITOH, THE JAPANESE SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL POLICIES 24 (1989). 
 2. David S. Law, The Anatomy of a Conservative Court: Judicial Review in Japan, 87 TEX. L. 
REV. 1545, 1551 (2009). 
 3. John O. Haley, The Japanese Judiciary: Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy, and the Public 
Trust, in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 103, 111 (Daniel H. Foote ed., 2007).  
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this closely followed custom by which court membership is apportioned 
among career judges, private attorneys, prosecutors, academics, and 
bureaucrats. Perhaps it is best described as a system of reserved seats. 
The most remarkable aspect of this practice is its extraordinary 
continuity. The rigid adherence to an allocation formula has its roots in the 
selection of the first group of fifteen Supreme Court justices who took 
office in August 1947. There was a significant shift in the allocation 
during the period from 1969 through 1973, a turbulent era for Japan’s 
judiciary and for society at large. But when this shift was complete, a new 
equilibrium appeared and the adjusted allocation would remain essentially 
unchanged at least until the present, a period of nearly four decades. 
Part I of this Article describes the genesis of the allocation custom and 
the revolutionary nature of the decision to assign a significant number of 
seats to private attorneys and scholars, the only members of the Court who 
have spent a significant portion of their careers outside government 
service. Part II describes the reallocation of reserved seats engineered 
between 1969 and 1973, during the term of Chief Justice Ishida Kazuto. 
As described in greater detail below, the reallocation reduced the number 
of seats held by attorneys and scholars and institutionalized a new 
appointment pattern better designed to produce a Court that would enforce 
the agenda of conservative political leaders and limit the individual rights 
declared in Japan’s Constitution.  
I. THE FIRST ALLOCATION OF RESERVED SEATS ON JAPAN’S SUPREME 
COURT 
A. An Independent Judiciary 
The Potsdam Declaration provided overall direction for the 
comprehensive reforms to Japan’s legal system that were adopted during 
the immediate postwar era. Key language required Japan’s government to 
―remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic 
tendencies‖ and declared that ―[f]reedom of speech, of religion, and of 
thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be 
established.‖4 
Japan remained under the occupation of Allied military forces from 
their arrival in September 1945 until their withdrawal in 1952 with the 
conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Occupation officials were 
 
 
 4. Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender, U.S.-P.R.C.-U.K., July 26, 1945, in 13 
DEP’T ST. BULL. 137 [hereinafter Potsdam Declaration] (setting forth the terms of Japan’s surrender). 
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intimately involved in drafting Japan’s Constitution and in the 
development and review of legal reforms, especially during the early years 
when the most fundamental changes were made. When they considered 
reforms to Japan’s legal profession, Occupation officials found some 
obvious targets. 
The first was establishing the independence of the judiciary. Prior to 
the 1947 Constitution, the judiciary was subject to the control of the 
executive branch of government. Alfred Oppler, who was charged with 
oversight of a broad range of legal reforms, explained this relationship as 
follows:
5
  
The courts were under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Justice 
who was responsible for their budget as well as for the appointment 
and promotion of judges. Obviously, this arrangement endangered 
genuine independence, inasmuch as ambitious and opportunistic 
judges were tempted to adjust their opinions to the presumptive 
wishes of the government.
6
 
A related goal was to elevate the status of Japan’s lawyers. For Oppler, the 
two objectives were closely linked: ―It was clear to us from the beginning 
that the liberation from government control of the bar had to follow the 
creation of an independent judiciary.‖7 
The foundation for an independent judiciary was built into the 
Constitution itself. Key provisions in the SCAP draft
8
 clarified that the 
―whole judicial power‖ would be entrusted to the courts; that the Supreme 
Court would determine ―the rules of procedure and practice, and of matters 
relating to attorneys, the internal discipline of the courts, and of the 
administration of judicial affairs;‖ that the Supreme Court itself would 
decide candidates for appointment as lower court judges; and that the 
 
 
 5. For a description of Oppler’s extraordinary career and role in the Occupation-era legal 
reforms, see TAKEMAE EIJI, INSIDE GHQ: THE ALLIED OCCUPATION OF JAPAN AND ITS LEGACY 160–
61 (2002). 
 6. Alfred C. Oppler, The Reform of Japan’s Legal and Judicial System Under Allied 
Occupation, 24 WASH. L. REV. 290, 305 (1949). While recognizing ministry control over judicial 
administration, Professor Haley nonetheless stresses the tradition of judicial independence that had 
developed under the Meiji Constitution. Haley, supra note 3, at 115. 
 7. ALFRED C. OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN—A PARTICIPANT LOOKS BACK 
108 (1976). 
 8. ―SCAP‖ stands for Supreme Commander of Allied Powers, the position held by General 
Douglas MacArthur until his removal in 1951. The first draft of Japan’s 1947 Constitution was 
prepared in secret by a team of Occupation officials acting under MacArthur’s orders. It was delivered 
to the Shidehara Cabinet in February 1946. See, e.g., RAY A. MOORE & DONALD L. ROBINSON, 
PARTNERS FOR DEMOCRACY: CRAFTING THE NEW JAPANESE STATE UNDER MACARTHUR 93–110 
(2002). 
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compensation of judges would not be decreased during their terms of 
office. No judge could be removed from office ―except by public 
impeachment unless judicially declared mentally or physically 
incompetent . . . .‖9 Together with this independence, Article 81 of the 
Japanese Constitution granted the Supreme Court real power—the 
unambiguous authority to declare acts of the administration or legislature 
unconstitutional. 
These provisions were accepted unchanged by the Shidehara Cabinet 
and then by the Diet. In order to emphasize the new status of the Court, the 
Diet added language declaring that the Chief Justice would be 
ceremonially appointed by the Emperor, the only official other than the 
Prime Minister to enjoy this honor. This new judicial regime was included 
in the constitutional text promulgated by the Emperor on November 3, 
1946, which took effect on May 3, 1947. 
Although Oppler did not work on the draft Constitution, he became the 
central Occupation figure involved in shaping the Courts Act, which 
would provide additional protections for judicial independence. Despite 
the clear direction shown by the constitutional provisions, adoption of the 
Constitution did not end the battle for judicial independence; Ministry of 
Justice officials sought to retain control over the judiciary by maintaining 
authority over its budget and personnel matters.
10
 Oppler and his 
colleagues sided with the judges. As a result, Articles 80 and 83 of the 
Courts Act specified that the judiciary would submit its own budget to the 
Diet and would maintain control over other administrative matters. 
B. Elevating the Status of Attorneys 
Meanwhile, the Occupation officials’ desire to grant ―liberation from 
government control of the bar‖ did not progress so smoothly. Throughout 
their relatively short history as a formally recognized element of Japan’s 
legal profession, private attorneys had always occupied a position inferior 
to that of judges and prosecutors.
11
 This inferior status was symbolized by 
the common term for private attorneys, zaiya hoso, which literally means 
 
 
 9. NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 78. 
 10. See Interview with Nemoto Matsuo, in 2 NOMURA JIRO, HOSO ANO KORO 205 (Nihon 
Hyoronsha, 1981). 
 11. The first statute providing recognition of private attorneys was adopted in 1893. For 
authoritative accounts of these issues in English, see Hattori Takaaki, The Legal Profession in Japan: 
Its Historical Development and Present State, in LAW IN JAPAN 111, 126–29 (Arthur Taylor von 
Mehren ed., 1963), and JOHN OWEN HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE 
PARADOX 100–01 (1991).  
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―outside lawyers.‖ This term distinguished them from the ―inside,‖ or 
government, lawyers, comprised of judges and prosecutors. 
Occupation officials sought to raise that status to a level equivalent 
with other members of the legal profession.
12
 The most direct objective in 
this regard was passage of a law that would guarantee the bar associations 
autonomy in determining their membership and in disciplining members. 
But institutional opposition was great. Although the Courts Act and a new 
prosecutors law were hammered out in time to coincide with enforcement 
of the new Constitution, passage of the Attorneys Act would be delayed 
for two more years due to opposition from the Supreme Court and the 
Ministry of Justice.
13
 
During this interval, Occupation officials took other steps to improve 
the status of attorneys, regularly meeting senior officers of the bar 
associations and often according their opinions equivalent importance to 
those of senior judges and Ministry of Justice officials.
14
 Regarding the 
Attorneys Act itself, Occupation officials made clear they would not 
approve any statute that did not provide for bar association autonomy.
15
 
Of course, the single step with the greatest symbolic and potentially 
substantive importance was the appointment of attorneys to the newly 
created, newly independent Supreme Court. Prior to 1947, Japan’s highest 
court, the Great Court of Cassation or Dai-shin-in, included only career 
judges and prosecutors. When the first Supreme Court ascended to the 
bench in August 1947, attorneys were not merely included; they were 
 
 
 12. This theme is present throughout Oppler’s writings on reform of the legal profession. For 
example, commenting on qualifications for Supreme Court appointment, he wrote: ―The recognition of 
long experience at the bar was especially gratifying, since it enhanced the prestige of the lawyers.‖ 
OPPLER, supra note 7, at 97.  
 13. See Lawrence Repeta, Japan’s 1949 Attorneys Law—Private Lawyers Gain Autonomy, 
Foreign Lawyers Find a New Path to the Bar, in LAW AND PRACTICE IN POSTWAR JAPAN: THE 
POSTWAR LEGAL REFORMS AND THEIR INFLUENCE 51 (2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1688039. 
 14. Describing conferences organized by SCAP officials that included representatives from all 
branches of the legal profession to discuss legislative reforms in 1947 and 1948, the authors of an 
official U.S. government report crowed, ―the leading member of the bar association emphasized his 
satisfaction over the fact that for the first time in Japanese history, lawyers, serving as representatives 
of the legal profession, had been allowed to participate in the drafting and deliberation of a Cabinet 
bill.‖ POLITICAL REORIENTATION OF JAPAN—SEPTEMBER 1945–SEPTEMBER 1948, at 199 [hereinafter 
REORIENTATION] (report of Government Section, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers). 
 15. Thomas Blakemore used the term ―triangular deadlock‖ to describe the stalemate over bar 
association autonomy. See Repeta, supra note 13, at 53. The deadlock was broken when the attorneys 
ultimately obtained Occupation approval for draft legislation and then pushed it through the Diet as a 
member’s bill in the summer of 1949. Oppler was quite pleased: ―Gratifyingly enough, it was finally 
settled among the Japanese, on the basis of the view of the bar association.‖ Oppler, supra note 6, at 
315. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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awarded a number of seats nearly equal to the number allocated to career 
judges. This represented a radical change in status for the zaiya hoso.  
The addition of attorneys, along with academic experts, to the Court 
was an important step in the overall plan of democratic legal reform. 
Occupation officials placed a very large bet on the role to be played by the 
Supreme Court in Japan’s development as a democratic society. The 
Constitution proclaimed a long list of individual liberties; through exercise 
of judicial review, the courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, would be 
the final line of defense to protect these liberties against potential abuse by 
government authority. In order for this scheme to work, the Court would 
have to be populated by judges who understood the significance of Japan’s 
new ―bill of rights‖ and who would be willing to stand up for individuals 
who sought to exercise these rights against government interference. 
Where could such judges be found?  
Japan’s legal profession had been created under the Meiji Constitution, 
in the service of a divine sovereign monarch, in a world of subjects rather 
than citizens. There was no postwar purge of the judiciary. Senior judges 
were individuals who had been elevated by the Ministry of Justice during 
the war years.
16
 Even private lawyers had been trained under a 
constitutional order that denied the primacy of individual rights, and few 
of them had taken significant steps to oppose Japan’s militarization and 
suppression of political speech during the prewar and wartime era. 
Nonetheless, it was a fair bet that private attorneys would show the most 
enthusiasm for the individual rights expressed in the Constitution.
17
 
Placing some of them on the Supreme Court would surely be a step toward 
the protection of those rights.  
C. The Battle Over the Initial Supreme Court Appointments  
Serious work on the process of selecting Supreme Court Justices began 
not long after the Shidehara Cabinet published the SCAP draft as its own 
in March 1946.
18
 The Constitution unequivocally placed the power of 
appointment in the Cabinet. The Cabinet’s discretion was limited only by 
language in the Courts Act that set a minimum age of forty and required 
that candidates have ―broad vision and extensive knowledge of the law‖ 
 
 
 16. Id. at 305.  
 17. The attorneys who drafted the 1949 Attorneys Act left no doubt in this regard. The very first 
sentence of Article 1 of the Act reads, ―A practicing attorney is entrusted with a mission to protect 
fundamental human rights and to realize social justice.‖ Bengoshi Ho [Attorney’s Act], Law No. 205 
of 1949, art. 1. 
 18. See, e.g., MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 8, at 139–41. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/14
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and that ten of the fifteen justices meet minimum experience 
requirements.
19
 This formulation was especially remarkable in two ways: 
(1) it explicitly recognized service as a private attorney on par with service 
as a judge or prosecutor, and (2) it opened the door to the appointment of 
individuals who had not worked in the legal profession at all.  
Occupation officials were so concerned about appointments, however, 
that they insisted the Cabinet be advised by an expert committee.
20
 The 
source of this idea was the American ―Missouri Plan,‖ which involves the 
use of nonpartisan committees to recommend qualified candidates to state 
governors.
21
 Regarding the intended role of this body, Occupation officials 
would later explain that ―the device was intended as a psychological check 
on the Cabinet because it was anticipated that the Committee would 
consist of outstanding figures of public life rather than political 
appointees.‖22 
When a government emissary showed Oppler its first draft list of 
committee members, however, he rejected it on the spot.
23
 The proposed 
committee would have been dominated by politicians. Of the nine 
members, four would be political leaders, including the Prime Minister, 
who would serve as chair; in addition, places would be reserved for the 
prosecutor general, the chief judges of the Great Court of Cassation and 
the administrative court, an attorney, and an academic.
24
 The Occupation’s 
 
 
 19. Saibanshohō [Courts Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 41. There was a dispute over whether 
nonprofessionals should be allowed to qualify for appointment. Oppler and Blakemore favored 
allocating all Supreme Court positions to legal professionals, but a consensus on the appointment of 
nonprofessionals had formed in the Ministry of Justice as early as July 1946. When Minister of Justice 
Kimura did not back down, Oppler decided not to force the issue by ordering a change in the language 
prepared by the Ministry. A recent article by Professor Nishikawa provides a valuable summary of the 
events in this era. Nishikawa S hin’ichi, Saikosai no Rutsu wo Saguru—Saibanshohoan Kiso kara 
Mibuchi Court Seiritsu Made (Uncovering the Roots of the Supreme Court—from Proposal of the 
Courts Bill Until Establishment of the Mibuchi Court), 78 SEIKEI RONSO, nos. 1–2, Nov. 2009.  
 20. Oppler indicated his approval of the advisory committee at a joint meeting of Japanese and 
Occupation experts on December 2, 1946. Agreement to include text in the Courts Act implementing 
this idea was reached at such a joint meeting on March 3, 1947. Justice Hosono represented the Great 
Court of Cassation and Kimura represented the Justice Ministry in these meetings. Nishikawa, supra 
note 19, at 24–25. Materials considered by the Judicial System Reform Council (1998–2001) (JSRC) 
also specify that Occupation officials issued an order to establish the advisory committee in meetings 
with government officials in March 1947. Memorandum from the JSRC (Mar. 1947), available at 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/seido/dai11/11siryou3.pdf (cited by Foote, infra note 
21); see also ITOH, supra note 1, at 16. Professor Itoh provides a detailed description of the 
appointment and operation of this committee in 1947 at pages 20–24. See also YAMAMOTO YUJI, 
SAIKOSAI MONOGATARI (THE SUPREME COURT STORY) 83 (Kodansha, 1979). 
 21. See Daniel H. Foote, Recent Reforms to the Japanese Judiciary: Real Change or Mere 
Appearance?, 66 HOSHAKAIGAKU [SOC. OF LAW] (2007). 
 22. REORIENTATION, supra note 14, at 201. 
 23. Nishikawa, supra note 19, at 43; 1 YAMAMOTO, supra note 20, at 83–84. 
 24. The list is reproduced at Nishikawa, supra note 19, at 34. 
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―psychological check‖ was intended to dilute political influence on 
appointments. Oppler judged that this committee would be dominated by 
politicians and would therefore fail in its central purpose. The Yoshida 
administration quickly revised its plan, expanding committee membership 
to eleven, this time to include four career judges, three attorneys, two 
academics, and only two politicians.
25
 This formula was approved by 
Occupation authorities. By an order issued on April 16, 1947, the Yoshida 
Cabinet established the revised advisory committee.
26
  
The new committee included Oppler’s personal favorite for the role of 
Chief Justice, Hosono Nagayoshi, a unique figure in Japan’s legal world 
with a reputation as an outspoken advocate for judicial independence. In a 
well-known incident from the war years, Hosono had openly opposed 
direct interference in judicial affairs by then-prime minister Tojo Hideki.
27
 
After war’s end, Hosono was elevated to the position of president of the 
Great Court of Cassation, Japan’s highest tribunal under the Meiji 
Constitution. He would be the last person to hold that office. 
Despite his inclusion in the revised advisory committee, Hosono was 
isolated, surrounded by individuals who opposed his leadership. Ignoring 
his attempts to establish criteria for Supreme Court consideration, the 
committee pushed forward and quickly produced a list of thirty candidates. 
Committee members were themselves eligible for selection, but the list of 
thirty did not include Hosono.
28
 When the Committee forwarded this list to 
the Prime Minister on April 22, it appended a statement requesting that the 
Supreme Court appointees include ―three scholars and as many judges and 
lawyers as possible‖ (gakkai-gawa yori wa san-mei, bengoshi-gawa, 
hanji-gawa yori wa narubeku tasu).
29
 The Yoshida administration was 
prepared to select fifteen individuals from this list and would be ready to 
appoint them in time to coincide with the Constitution taking force on 
May 3.  
But national Diet elections were scheduled for April 25, and some 
questioned the advisability of allowing Supreme Court appointments by 
 
 
 25. Id. at 38–39.  
 26. Id. at 40. 
 27. Of course, Occupation officials were well aware of this history. See OPPLER, supra note 7, 
at 87.  
 28. Nishikawa provides a list of candidates with the vote total gathered by each. The names of 
six individuals appear at the top, with ten votes each. Hosono finished out of the running, tied for 
forty-first place with only two votes. Nishikawa, supra note 19, at 44. 
 29. Id. at 45. Professor Nishikawa writes that ―the idea that the selection of Supreme Court 
justices should reflect career allocations (shusshinwaku) can already be seen at this point.‖ Of course, 
this advice reflected the career histories of advisory committee members and committee membership 
that was shaped by Oppler’s constant pressure.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/14
  
 
 
 
 
2011] RESERVED SEATS ON JAPAN’S SUPREME COURT 1721 
 
 
 
 
the lame duck Cabinet.
30
 Meanwhile, Hosono and his allies reported their 
dissatisfaction with Hosono’s exclusion from the Court to Oppler.31 
Professor Itoh describes the result: ―the proposed appointments were 
unexpectedly delayed by General MacArthur who instructed Prime 
Minister Yoshida Shigeru to postpone the appointments until the first 
elections for the Diet had been held under the new Constitution.‖32 When 
informed that his selections had been blocked, Yoshida pleaded his case to 
MacArthur himself, to no effect.
33
 
Yoshida then proceeded to lose the May Diet elections to a coalition 
led by Katayama Tetsu of the Socialist Party. On June 5, new Prime 
Minister Katayama released a public statement expounding on the 
importance of the Supreme Court and declaring that the selection process 
would be fair, transparent, and democratic (iwayuru garasu-bari no naka 
de mottomo minshuteki).
34
 The Katayama Cabinet quickly issued a new 
order creating an advisory body of its own.
35
 This committee would have 
fifteen members, with the Speaker of the House of Representatives serving 
as Chair. Among the fifteen, judges and attorneys would be accorded 
parity, with four seats allocated to each.
36
 But, apparently carried away 
with democratic spirit, the Katayama order added another twist. 
Rather than directly appoint all members of the advisory committee, 
the Katayama order provided that committee members from the legal 
profession would be chosen by elections, with all attorneys, judges, and 
prosecutors actually voting to select their representatives on the 
committee.
37
 Voting for the four seats allocated to judges was held on July 
 
 
 30. Id. at 45–46. 
 31. Oppler was said to be ―very dissatisfied‖ with the list of thirty Supreme Court candidates. Id. 
at 43; 1 YAMAMOTO, supra note 20, at 91. To slow down the process, he informed Japanese 
government officials that the individuals would have to be investigated by Occupation officials prior to 
appointment. 1 YAMAMOTO, supra note 20, at 91. 
 32. ITOH, supra note 1, at 20.  
 33. 1 YAMAMOTO, supra note 20, at 91–92. Nishikawa provides a quotation from MacArthur’s 
letter instructing that the first Supreme Court should be appointed by a Cabinet selected under the 
procedures provided by the new Constitution. Nishikawa, supra note 19, at 46. 
 34. Id. at 48. 
 35. It is believed that both the Prime Minister’s statement and the Cabinet regulation were 
drafted by the new Justice Minister Suzuki Yoshio. The latter was especially unusual in that the Justice 
Minister bypassed the ministry bureaucracy by drafting the order and presenting it to Occupation 
authorities for approval. Id. at 48–49. 
 36. One explanation for the decision to include four attorneys is that this would allow 
appointment of representatives of the three Tokyo bar associations and one to represent Kansai. Id. at 
49. 
 37. ITOH, supra note 1, at 21–22. Among members from outside the legal profession and thus not 
subject to election, the Cabinet appointed the noted scholars Wagatsuma Sakae and Takigawa 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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10. When the votes were counted, it was discovered that Hosono and his 
allies failed again. This time, Hosono was the victim of a smear campaign 
apparently organized by anti-Hosono judges. The campaign included 
distribution of a counterfeit telegram sent to judges throughout the country 
falsely indicating that a key judicial candidate had declared that if elected, 
he would not join the committee.
38
 This apparently redirected a critical 
number of votes in favor of anti-Hosono judges, who won all four 
advisory committee seats allocated to the judiciary.  
After the election results were final, the Katayama advisory committee 
was empanelled and produced a new list of thirty candidates to the 
Cabinet. Oppler and others would be surprised to see that the transfer of 
power from Yoshida to Katayama and the procedural changes had not 
made a great difference in the results. Of the fifteen justices selected by 
the Katayama Cabinet, the names of no fewer than eleven had appeared on 
the lists submitted by both the Yoshida and the Katayama advisory 
committees. Moreover, committee members were not shy about placing 
their own names at the top of their lists. Of the fifteen selected for 
Supreme Court duty, six had themselves served as advisory committee 
members.
39
 Oppler was no doubt displeased by this result, but decided that 
it would not be appropriate for Occupation officials to intervene again.
40
  
The Katayama selections were sworn in as Japan’s first Supreme Court 
on August 4, 1947. According to Professor Itoh’s analysis, they included 
six career judges, five private attorneys, one prosecutor, one law professor, 
one judicial administrator, and one diplomat.
41
 
After the series of fiascoes that attended the selection of Japan’s first 
Supreme Court, Oppler’s ―Missouri Plan‖ committee quickly disappeared, 
 
 
Yukitoki, chairpersons of the faculties of law at the Universities of Tokyo and Kyoto, respectively. Id. 
at 22. 
 38. Details of the ―false telegram incident‖ (nise dempo jiken) and other aspects of the smear 
campaign are reported at Nishikawa, supra note 19, at 53, and YAMAMOTO, supra note 20, vol.1, at 
96–101. Nishikawa writes that 1250 judges were eligible to vote. Nishikawa, supra note 19, at 51. 
 39. Nishikawa provides a handy chart that reveals these connections. Id. at 55.  
 40. Details are provided in 1 YAMAMOTO, supra note 20, at 103, and in interviews with Nemoto 
Matsuo and Kawamura Kiyoshi in NOMURA , supra note 10. 
 41. ITOH, supra note 1, at 24. Itoh notes that there is a minor disagreement over this 
classification. Id. Nishikawa calculates the allocation as five judges, five attorneys, and five others. 
Nishikawa, supra note 19, at 56. Throughout the postwar era, there have been a few appointees with 
hybrid careers. Perhaps the most prominent example is that of Sonobe Itsuo, who worked extended 
periods as both a judge and a full-time academic before appointment to the Supreme Court in 1989. He 
was appointed to fill the seat reserved for academics at the relatively young age of sixty. He served for 
ten years. During this period, no other academic was appointed to the Court. Justice Sonobe’s 
experience is rare. Due to the segmented nature of Japan’s legal profession, nearly all Justices have 
spent their careers in a single branch of the legal profession.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/14
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eliminated by a revision to the Courts Act effective January 1, 1948. 
Although the idea of creating a new expert advisory body has been raised 
on several occasions since, there has been no action.
42
 All subsequent 
Supreme Court appointments have been made by Cabinet authority 
without reference to the opinions of such a committee. Nonetheless, it was 
the Katayama Cabinet and its advisory committee that established the 
model for allocation of Supreme Court appointments that has prevailed 
ever since.  
Oppler may not have gotten the specific personnel he had in mind, but 
he did have the satisfaction of seeing that attorneys comprised a significant 
portion of the Court and had even achieved a rough parity with career 
judges. In an essay published in 1988, Nomura Jiro, an Asahi news 
reporter who had covered Japan’s courts for decades, provided the 
following interpretation of these events: 
From the beginning, the reason that the Supreme Court includes 
attorneys (zaiya hoso) and intellectuals (gakushiki keikensha) is that 
the Occupation authorities wanted to establish an American-style 
legal profession as a basic element of the democratization of Japan. 
Of course, whether elected or appointed, starting with the federal 
Supreme Court and including state court judges and prosecutors, 
(all American judges and prosecutors) have experienced work as 
private attorneys. In Japan this is called a unified legal profession 
(hoso ichigen). 
 The Americans tried to introduce this system to Japan. However, 
in the era immediately after the war’s end, the power of the 
bureaucrats was still great; it was not possible to suddenly introduce 
such a system while there were defects in the structure of the legal 
world. This effort reflected good insight, but it was not realistic. 
Japan’s judicial officials objected sharply; ultimately it ended with 
the Occupation (GHQ) achieving a portion of their plan for the 
Supreme Court. Therefore, allocation of seats on the Supreme Court 
can be called the GHQ’s child of compromise.43 
For Nomura, this compromise was significant. He envisioned a special 
role for the attorneys on the Court, because they are ―closest to the people‖ 
 
 
 42. Professor Foote provides a description of ―Missouri Plan‖ systems in the United States and 
reports that the Judicial System Reform Council considered revival of such a committee as one option 
to inject greater transparency into the nominating process. See Foote, supra note 21. 
 43. Nomura Jiro, Bengoshikai to Saikosai Hanji [Bar Associations and Supreme Court Justices], 
39 JIYU TO SEIGI, no. 2, 1988, at 41, 45. 
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and would have a ―duty to express their views and opinions from a 
standpoint different from that of justices who spent their careers as 
bureaucrats (kanryo shusshin).‖44 
Whether or not one agrees with Nomura’s assessment, there is no doubt 
that the inclusion of attorneys and others from outside the career judiciary 
was a radical break with the past. The highest court under the Meiji 
Constitution included only career judges and prosecutors. Actual 
experience has shown that attorneys and academics are typically less 
predictable than career government officials—especially career judges and 
prosecutors—appointed to the Court, and they are more willing to write 
separate and even dissenting opinions.
45
  
Nomura’s ―child of compromise‖ would survive for the next two 
decades relatively unchanged. Then, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
when conservative governments faced widespread public dissent and 
liberal courts that sometimes ruled in favor of civil liberties and against 
government authority, they chose to intervene. The Sato and Tanaka 
administrations used the power of appointment to adjust the allocation of 
Supreme Court seats and shift Court ideology to the right. A critical tool in 
accomplishing this shift was a reallocation of ―reserved seats.‖ The 
reserved seat formula established in 1947 would be subject to a 
momentous revision. 
II. REALLOCATING RESERVED SEATS 
A. Fighting in the Streets—Demonstrators v. Police (1967–1968) 
A significant reallocation in the reserved seat system occurred during 
the early 1970s, an era of great turbulence in society at large and one in 
which Japan’s judiciary reached a bumpy crossroad that is commonly 
labeled the ―judicial crisis‖ (shiho no kiki). The effect of this reallocation 
was to dilute the early postwar achievement of democratizing the Supreme 
Court by reducing the number of seats reserved for attorneys and scholars 
and increasing the number allocated to prosecutors and other career 
government officials.  
This reallocation was executed by Japan’s ruling conservative elite in 
response to a series of court decisions that upheld the rights of challengers 
to the political status quo, including antigovernment demonstrators and 
 
 
 44. Id.  
 45. See J. Mark Ramseyer, Predicting Court Outcomes Through Political Preferences: The 
Japanese Supreme Court and the Chaos of 1993, 58 DUKE L.J. 1557, 1575–78 (2009). 
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labor leaders. It occurred at a time of widespread challenges to 
government legitimacy around the world, with massive antigovernment 
demonstrations leading to confrontations between police and 
demonstrators that often turned violent and sometimes threatened the 
political status quo.  
Japan experienced a period of violent clashes between well-organized 
groups of radical students and massed bodies of riot police beginning in 
the late 1960s. Many of the largest and most heavily reported 
demonstrations protested the government’s support for the American war 
in Vietnam. In the autumn of 1967, for example, thousands of students 
mobilized and attempted to block Prime Minister Sato’s departures on 
trips to South Vietnam and the United States from Tokyo’s Haneda 
Airport. Hundreds were arrested and dozens injured. A few months later, 
another mass of demonstrators appeared at Sasebo naval base in Kyushu to 
protest the arrival of the giant nuclear-powered American aircraft carrier, 
Enterprise. Images of police beating demonstrators, news reporters, and 
innocent bystanders were broadcast throughout Japan.
46
 The radical 
student movement grew rapidly. Student anger and frustration were also 
directed at university administrations. By the end of 1968, groups had 
occupied dozens of university campuses, including the nation’s most 
prestigious school, the University of Tokyo. 
B. Fighting in the Courts—Political Reaction to Liberal Court Decisions 
of the 1960s (1966–1969) 
Sometimes police who arrested demonstrators would be surprised to 
see that district court judges released their suspects from detention or 
acquitted them in subsequent prosecutions. These cases presented a classic 
confrontation between the demonstrators’ rights to free speech and 
assembly against the government’s duty to provide for public safety. 
Japan’s local public safety ordinances require individuals to obtain permits 
as a condition to conducting parades and other demonstrations in roads 
and public spaces. By attaching conditions to these permits and 
threatening the arrest of demonstrators who might violate them, the police 
have an effective tool to limit and control public demonstrations.
47
 Of 
 
 
 46. See William Marotti, Japan 1968: The Performance of Violence and the Theater of 
Protest, AM. HIST. REV., Feb. 2009, at 97. 
 47. For an overview of Japan’s public safety ordinance scheme, see LAWRENCE WARD BEER, 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN JAPAN 166–68 (1984).  
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course, they also have the power to arrest and detain individuals they 
decide to remove from the scene. 
In the late 1960s, the Tokyo District Court and a number of other trial 
courts granted acquittals to individuals prosecuted for violating these 
ordinances; some courts held that police application of the vaguely worded 
ordinances violated constitutional due process.
48
 One panel of the Kyoto 
District Court even ruled a local public safety ordinance unconstitutional 
on its face.
49
 These decisions drew heavy criticism from right-wing 
publications and conservative politicians who were outraged to see that 
judges were ruling in favor of demonstrators and against the police.
50
 In 
August 1968, a Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) publication called for an 
attack against these ―biased judgments‖ (henkou hanketsu).51 Two months 
later, the Cabinet Minister charged with police oversight criticized the 
courts, declaring at a press conference that the rate of detention of 
protestors was too low.
52
 As 1968 came to a close, it appeared that a battle 
line was being drawn between Japan’s conservative ruling party and a 
cadre of liberal judges. 
The Sato Cabinet would open the new year by appointing a new Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court. The man selected, Ishida Kazuto, had served 
as an associate Justice for the preceding five-and-a-half years and had 
acquired a reputation as a hard-nosed guardian of law and order. Ishida 
was one of the Justices who dissented in the landmark 1966 Tokyo Central 
Post Office Grand Bench decision that had sharply limited criminal 
prosecutions of labor leaders (discussed below). As the Sato 
administration struggled to maintain law and order on the streets and to 
 
 
 48. The constitutional source of Japan’s doctrine of due process is Article 31, which reads: ―No 
person shall be deprived of life or liberty, nor shall any other criminal penalty be imposed, except 
according to procedure established by law.‖ NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 31. 
For descriptions of these cases in English, see BEER, supra note 47, at 183–86. See also Masahiro 
Usaki, Restrictions on Political Campaigns in Japan, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 153 (1990). 
Professor Ramseyer investigates the subsequent careers of some of the judges that issued these 
decisions. See J. MARK RAMSEYER & FRANCES MCCALL ROSENBLUTH, JAPAN’S POLITICAL 
MARKETPLACE 172–75 (1993). 
 49. Kyoto Chihō Saibansho [Kyoto Dist. Ct.] Feb. 23, 1967, 480 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 3. 
 50. Professor Ode Yoshitomo published a detailed recitation of the events of this period in a new 
book that appeared in 2009. He indentifies several of the publications that appeared in 1968. Ode 
Yoshitomo, Dai Isshou Naganuma Sosho- Hiraga Shokan Mondai no Haikei [Chapter One: 
Background to the Naganuma Litigation and the Hiraga Letter Problem], in NAGANUMA JIKEN 
HIRAGA SHOKAN—35 NENME NO SHOGEN—JIEITAI IKEN HANKETSU TO SHIHO NO KIKI [THE 
NAGANUMA CASE AND THE HIRATA MEMO, TESTIMONY AFTER 35 YEARS, JUDGMENT OF SELF-
DEFENSE FORCE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY AND THE JUDICIARY CRISIS] (Fukushima Shigeo et al. eds., 
2009) 141–42 [hereinafter Ode, Background]. 
 51. Id. at 142. 
 52. Id.  
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manage LDP hawks calling for tougher measures against demonstrators, it 
had strong incentive to select a Chief Justice who could be relied upon to 
lead the Supreme Court in backing up its efforts.  
Associate Justice Tanaka Jiro had been considered to be a leading 
candidate to replace retiring Chief Justice Yokota.
53
 A highly respected 
scholar at the University of Tokyo and an intellectual leader of the Court’s 
liberal wing in the 1960s, Tanaka was also said to be favored by Prime 
Minister Sato, who was himself a graduate of the University of Tokyo. But 
in the waning months of 1968, opinion within the Sato administration 
turned against Tanaka and became a strong consensus for Ishida.
5455
 Some 
say it was a visit to the Prime Minister by the old conservative warhorse 
Kimura Tokutaro in December that made the difference.
56
 In any case, 
Ishida was appointed Chief Justice on January 11. As he took up his 
duties, battles outside the courthouse doors continued. Just one week after 
his appointment, riot police moved onto the University of Tokyo campus 
and ejected radical student groups from their extended occupation of 
university buildings in another bloody confrontation.
57
  
Meanwhile, calls within the LDP for a crackdown on liberal judges 
became more strident. At a press conference held on March 25, the 
Minister of Justice declared that something had to be done to reverse the 
trend of lower court decisions favoring political demonstrators and 
suggested that the Diet employ its control on the judicial budget to change 
 
 
 53. 1 YAMAMOTO, supra note 20, at 350–55; Ode, Background, supra note 50, at 147–50. 
 54. Fragmentary comments in the published diary of Prime Minister Sato provide some insight to 
his personal involvement in Supreme Court personnel matters. On January 8, 1969, he met with 
outgoing Chief Justice Yokota and on the following day with leading candidate Ishida. In one diary 
entry, the Prime Minister took care to note that Ishida had the support of the Prosecutors’ Office and 
that he was a kendo master. Ode, Background, supra note 50, at 150.  
 55. Id.  
 56. Professor Miyazawa points out that Kimura ―was the last justice minister right after the war 
prior to the separation of the judiciary and the prosecution.‖ Setsuo Miyazawa, Administrative Control 
of Japanese Judges, 25 KOBE UNIV. L. REV. 45, 58 (1991). In this role, Kimura led the Ministry of 
Justice in negotiations over reforms concerning the legal profession during the period when the 
Ministry opposed autonomy for bar associations and sought to retain budgetary and personnel control 
over the judiciary. See supra notes 10–17 and accompanying text. Kimura and Ishida were very close 
associates. Kimura was known as a fierce anti-communist and leader of the conservative wing of the 
LDP. At the time of his visit to Prime Minister Sato in 1968, he was eighty-two years old. Ode tracks 
news reports concerning Tanaka’s candidacy and Ishida’s triumph. Ode, Background, supra note 50, at 
147–50. He places Kimura’s visit with the Prime Minister on December 19. Id. at 147. For 
Yamamoto’s account of the visit, see 1 YAMAMOTO, supra note 20, at 350–51. 
 57. The 2009 volume provides a very useful chronology of the events of this era with specific 
dates and other relevant information. See NAGANUMA JIKEN HIRAGA SHOKAN—35 NENME NO 
SHOGEN—JIEITAI IKEN HANKETSU TO SHIHO NO KIKI [THE NAGANUMA CASE AND THE HIRATA 
MEMO, TESTIMONY AFTER 35 YEARS, JUDGMENT OF SELF-DEFENSE FORCE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY 
AND JUDICIARY CRISIS] (Fukushima Shigeo et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter FUKUSHIMA CHRONOLOGY]. 
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the judicial attitudes.
58
 This statement was followed one week later by the 
Supreme Court Grand Bench decision in Tokyo Teachers Union, blocking 
criminal prosecution of striking public employees. Despite Ishida’s 
appointment as Chief Justice, the liberals continued to hold a strong 
majority on the Court. Ishida dissented again, as he had in the 1966 Tokyo 
Central Post Office case. Supreme Court judgments in these cases were 
emblematic of the liberal trend that so severely disturbed Japan’s political 
leaders. This line of cases commands our attention, for it traces the 
political transformation of Japan’s Supreme Court. 
C. A Liberal Supreme Court Blocks the Prosecution of Labor Leaders 
(1966–1969) 
Article 28 of the Constitution and a series of labor laws passed in the 
immediate postwar era laid a new foundation for labor-management 
relations in Japan, featuring a robust labor union movement. These 
reforms did not fully extend to government workers, however, who were 
generally denied the right to strike and engage in other ―dispute activities‖ 
(sogi koi) by a series of special statutes that applied to different categories 
of government employees.
59
 Of greatest consequence to most workers 
charged with violating these statutes, they impose criminal penalties for 
violation, thus authorizing police to take action. 
In a series of cases that arose in the late 1950s, the government arrested 
and prosecuted officers and members of several labor unions that represent 
government workers and charged them with violating provisions of the 
special statutes. These cases had big political significance because of the 
close alignment of organized labor with Japan’s Socialist Party and other 
opposition parties. Defendants in these cases were charged with violating 
the law by inciting workers to participate in rallies related both to working 
conditions and to political issues, such as opposition to renewal of the 
U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.  
When these cases began to reach the Supreme Court nearly a decade 
later, the Court was dominated by liberal justices who took the opportunity 
to reshape the law by reducing the scope of police enforcement. The 
epoch-making Tokyo Central Post Office case arose from the prosecution 
of several union officials for urging postal workers to leave work to attend 
a meeting. In a decision issued on October 26, 1966, the Supreme Court 
Grand Bench overturned guilty verdicts and imposed a significant 
 
 
 58. Ode, Background, supra note 50, at 143.  
 59. For the historical context, see TAKEMAE, supra note 5, at 324–27.  
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limitation on criminal prosecutions of workers charged with violating the 
Post Office Law. Stressing that the Constitution’s Article 28 guarantee of 
the right of workers to organize and bargain collectively applies to both 
private-sector and government workers, the Court held that criminal 
sanctions provided in the Post Office Law should be applied only in 
extreme cases such as those involving violence or which cause severe 
harm to the public. The Court reversed the convictions of the petitioners 
and remanded to the Tokyo High Court for further proceedings. Under the 
new standard, that court held the defendants not guilty.
60
  
Tokyo Central Post Office was followed two-and-a-half years later by 
two Grand Bench decisions issued on the same day that extended the 
Court’s new doctrine by interpreting statutes governing employees of the 
national government and local governments in a similar manner that 
restricted criminal prosecutions to a limited range of cases. On April 2, 
1969, the Grand Bench applied its restrictive interpretation to the National 
Public Employees Law in reviewing the prosecution of courthouse 
workers who participated in political meetings held during business hours 
to protest the 1960 extension of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Under this 
new standard, the Court upheld convictions of some defendants and 
dismissed others.
61
 
On the same day, by a vote of 11–4, the Grand Bench overturned the 
guilty verdicts of several officers of the Tokyo Teachers Union who had 
been charged with violating a provision of the Local Public Employees 
Law, which prohibits strikes and other dispute activities. In this case, the 
actions that led to arrests of union officials included circulating a directive 
to about 24,000 members calling on them to oppose implementation of a 
new work rating system and to join in a related gathering during work 
hours. Again showing deference to workers’ rights declared in Article 28 
of the Constitution, the Supreme Court applied its restrictive mode of 
analysis and explained that even if the defendants’ acts did violate the 
statute, criminal prosecution was not appropriate. The cases were 
dismissed.
62
  
 
 
 60. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 26, 1966, 20 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 
901 (Toyama v. Japan). The case is discussed by BEER, supra note 47, at 232. A translation of the 
Supreme Court opinions appears in HIROSHI ITOH & LAWRENCE WARD BEER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CASE LAW OF JAPAN, SELECTED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, 1961–70, at 85 (1978). 
 61. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 2, 1969, 23 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 
685 (Japan v. Sakane). A translation of the Supreme Court opinions appears in ITOH & BEER, supra 
note 60, at 103. For commentary on this case, see BEER, supra note 47, at 232–33.  
 62. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 2, 1969, 23 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 
305. For commentary on this case, see BEER, supra note 47, at 234–35. 
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D. The Effect of Liberal Court Decisions and the Conservative Political 
Response (1969–1971) 
The Supreme Court judgments in Tokyo Teachers Union and similar 
cases held great significance not only for the defendants themselves, but 
also for labor leaders who might consider organizing activities, as well as 
other activists around the country who might consider openly challenging 
the government in public forums. The authority to arrest and detain is the 
most coercive lawful power ordinarily available to the police in modern 
democracies. In Japan, where customary practice allows detention of 
suspects on a single charge for up to twenty-three days prior to indictment 
and where courts ordinarily deny bail thereafter at the request of the 
prosecution, the fear of criminal prosecution has an especially powerful 
chilling effect on individuals who might otherwise speak out.
63
 Moreover, 
as illustrated most recently in police action against critics of Japan’s Iraq 
war policy, the public security police (koan keisatsu) are willing to arrest 
and detain political opponents on trivial charges.
64
 
Under Tokyo Central Post Office, labor union leaders who broke the 
rules faced a significantly reduced form of punishment. They might be 
subject to fines or other administrative sanctions for most violations of 
statutes governing public employees, but not to arrest, detention, trial, and 
possible imprisonment.
65
  
Meanwhile, in other cases, many lower courts were applying modes of 
analysis that accorded a similarly high level of respect for other 
 
 
 63. The common use of extended detentions by Japan’s police and prosecutors has been 
described in numerous English-language publications. See, e.g., DAVID T. JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE 
WAY OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING CRIME IN JAPAN (2002); THE JAPANESE ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN 
CONTEXT: CONTROVERSIES AND COMPARISONS (Malcolm M. Feeley & Setsuo Miyazawa eds., 2002); 
Daniel H. Foote, Policymaking by the Japanese Judiciary in the Criminal Justice Field, 72 
HOSHAKAIGAKU [SOC. OF LAW] (2010). For a report of a recent example of condemnation of these 
practices by an international human rights body, see Lawrence Repeta, U.N. Committee Faults Japan 
Human Rights Performance, Demands Progress Report on Key Issues, ASIA-PAC. J.: JAPAN FOCUS, 
May 17, 2009, http://www.japanfocus.org/-Lawrence-Repeta/3147. 
 64. See David McNeill, Martyrs for Peace: Japanese Antiwar Activists Jailed for Trespassing in 
an SDF Compound Vow to Fight On, ASIA-PAC. J.: JAPAN FOCUS, May 31, 2008, http://www.japan 
focus.org/-David-McNeill/2766. The Supreme Court decision in this case (the Tachikawa case) was 
heavily reported in the news media. All Japanese daily newspapers carried accounts in the morning 
editions on April 12, 2008. The Tachikawa case was one of several similar prosecutions of individuals 
who distributed flyers criticizing government policy during this period, which coincided with the 
deployment of Japan Self-Defense Forces to Iraq.  
 65. Rather than hold the criminal provisions of these statutes unconstitutional, however, Grand 
Bench majorities in these cases interpreted them to allow criminal prosecutions only in a limited range 
of extreme cases involving incitement to violence or other high degrees of illegality. Regardless of the 
legal theory, for the defendants in these cases and for other labor activists, the result was the same.  
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constitutional rights, especially the rights of free speech and assembly. As 
the Supreme Court worked on the government employee cases, trial courts 
continued to process numerous criminal prosecutions that arose from street 
protests. Just a few days after the Supreme Court judgment in Tokyo 
Teachers Union, a trial court judgment was issued in a case involving one 
of the most heavily reported street confrontations of the protest era. On 
April 11, 1969, a panel of the Fukuoka District Court acquitted radical 
students who had been arrested in clashes with riot police as they protested 
arrival of the U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise the year 
before.
66
 Japan’s conservative political leadership had seen enough.  
On April 22, the secretary general of the LDP announced that the party 
would formally establish a committee of inquiry to investigate the 
judges.
67
 Alarmed at the repeated threats of retaliation by conservative 
politicians, the Supreme Court justices held an emergency meeting on the 
following day and issued a rare public statement in the name of the 
Justices Conference (saibankan kaigi, a conference of all fifteen Supreme 
Court Justices). Their statement declared that they did not know the 
intentions of the LDP committee of inquiry, but that any attempt to 
interfere in personnel matters or active cases would be a severe problem 
and that the Supreme Court was determined to defend its independence 
and fulfill its responsibilities under the Constitution.
68
 
By pulling together in a united front, the conservative and liberal wings 
of the Court had staved off the threat of direct intervention, at least for the 
time being. But there would be more turbulence in the months to come. 
And though elected political leaders had no easy way to intervene in 
specific cases, they did enjoy the constitutional power to select Supreme 
Court Justices to their liking. The selection of Ishida Kazuto as Chief 
Justice was a harbinger of appointments to come.  
 
 
 66. 1 YAMAMOTO, supra note 20, at 376–77. 
 67. The secretary general was Tanaka Kakuei, who would succeed Sato Eisaku as prime minister 
on July 7, 1972. That committee was appointed on May 13, under the leadership of a former Minister 
of Justice. Id. at 375; Ode, Background, supra note 50, at 143. 
 68. 1 YAMAMOTO, supra note 20, at 378. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1732 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88:1713 
 
 
 
 
E. The Naganuma Nike Missile Case and Supreme Court Action Against 
the Specter of Leftist Judges (1969–1971) 
Organized protest was not limited to radical students. On July 7, 
Japan’s Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry announced administrative 
action cancelling its designation of a protected forest area in Hokkaido.
69
 
The Ministry’s intention was to make that land available for construction 
of a Japan Self-Defense Force missile base. On the same day, 173 
residents of a nearby farming community joined to file suit in Sapporo 
District Court seeking a court order to reverse the Ministry’s action and 
thereby protect the forest and block construction of the missile base. Their 
central argument was the apparently audacious charge that the missile base 
was unlawful because the existence of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces itself 
violates Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution. In 1969, many legal scholars 
and ordinary citizens shared this opinion.
70
 Nonetheless, Japan’s legal 
world would be jolted when the district court panel led by Judge 
Fukushima Shigeo issued a temporary order blocking construction on 
August 22, 1969.
71
 
This case would lead to some severe tests for Japan’s judiciary. Judge 
Fukushima had completed his draft judgment and submitted it to a court 
 
 
 69. There are several accounts of the Naganuma Nike Missile case and the related YLA 
confrontation in English. Perhaps the most complete has been provided by Professor Ramseyer, in 
various publications. See RAMSEYER & ROSENBLUTH, supra note 48, at 161–81. For a recent account 
by Professor Haley, see Haley, supra note 3, at 121. See also Craig Martin, Binding the Dogs of War: 
Japan and the Constitutionalizing of Jus ad Bellum, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 267, 337–41 (2008). For 
Yamamoto’s detailed account of the YLA Incident, see 1 YAMAMOTO, supra note 20, at 79–116. 
Miyazawa’s early account in English has long served as an invaluable resource to foreign students who 
examine this historic case. Miyazawa, supra note 56, at 58. Nearly all writing in English addresses the 
issue of administrative control of lower court judges rather than the sudden change in the ideological 
makeup of the Court that occurred in this period. The continuing significance of these events is 
underscored by the 2009 appearance of a new 370-page volume devoted solely to this case. 
FUKUSHIMA CHRONOLOGY, supra note 57. 
 70. For recent treatments of the issues raised by Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, see 
Martin, supra note 69, at 316–27, and Hudson Hamilton, Emergence of the Right to Live in Peace in 
Japan, AUSTRALIAN J. OF ASIAN L. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1767652. 
 71. This injunction was quashed by the Sapporo High Court on January 23, 1970. The historic 
judgment of the Sapporo District Court finding the Self-Defense Forces unconstitutional would be 
issued on Sept. 7, 1973. Sapporo Chihō Saibansho [Sapporo Dist. Ct.] Sept. 7, 1973, 712 HANREI JIHŌ 
[HANJI] 24. It was later reversed by the Sapporo High Court on August 5, 1976. Sapporo Kōtō 
Saibansho [Sapporo High Ct.] Aug. 5, 1976, 27 GYŌSEI JIKEN SAIBAN REISHŪ [GYŌSAI REISHŪ] 
1175. On appeal, the Supreme Court dismissed for lack of standing. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 
9, 1982, 36 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1679. English translations of relevant 
decisions are available at LAWRENCE W. BEER & HIROSHI ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF 
JAPAN, 1970 THROUGH 1990, 83–130 (1996).  
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clerk on August 8.
72
 Two days later, he was called in for a meeting by 
Hiraga Kenta, the Chief Judge of the Sapporo District Court. Hiraga would 
be called away to Tokyo and the meeting postponed, but the Chief Judge 
left behind a letter to Fukushima in which he sought to persuade his young 
colleague to rule in favor of the government.
73
  
The public disclosure of this letter and subsequent uproar would cause 
unprecedented embarrassment for the judiciary and raise public concern 
over improper pressures on judges within Japan’s secretive judiciary.74 An 
ad hoc conference of all Hokkaido judges was held on September 13. 
After debate that continued into the early morning hours of September 14, 
the conference adopted a resolution of ―severe warning‖ (genju chui) 
against Chief Judge Hirata for interfering in a court proceeding.
75
 The 
letter itself was released to the public by the Hokkaido judicial conference 
on September 15. Five days later, Hiraga was reassigned to Tokyo.
76
 
The controversy moved to the Diet, which holds the authority to 
impeach judges. Throughout this era, the Diet was controlled by the 
conservative LDP. While the Party’s internal committee charged with 
investigating the judiciary continued its work on one hand, now a Diet 
committee also controlled by the LDP commenced impeachment 
proceedings against a junior judge with the audacity to rule the nation’s 
military unconstitutional and his senior colleague who intervened in an 
attempt to stop him. In the end, the Diet committee dismissed charges 
against the senior judge and issued a formal reprimand of the junior judge 
for disclosing the letter.
77
  
In the second half of 1969, Japan’s legal world was consumed in 
debates over the nature of judicial independence and the Diet’s treatment 
of the two judges, not to mention the constitutionality of Japan’s military. 
If this were not enough, as the year drew to a close, the judiciary faced yet 
another controversy. In late 1969, several publications carried reports 
suggesting that large numbers of Japan’s judges were leftists or leftist 
sympathizers.
78
 The center of the suspicious activity was said to be a group 
called the Seinen Horitsuka Kyokai (―Seihokyo,‖ or Young Lawyers 
 
 
 72. FUKUSHIMA CHRONOLOGY, supra note 57, at 4. 
 73. See 2 YAMAMOTO, supra note 20, at 29–42 for a detailed account of the incident.  
 74. Id. 
 75. Ode, Background, supra note 50, at 136; see also FUKUSHIMA CHRONOLOGY, supra note 57, 
at 4.  
 76. FUKUSHIMA CHRONOLOGY, supra note 57, at 4. 
 77. Ode, Background, supra note 50, at 136. 
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Association (YLA)).
79
 Even mainstream newspapers soon published 
editorials raising suspicions about the influence of the YLA.
80
 Japan’s 
conservative political leaders would readily surmise that YLA influence 
explained the rash of court judgments against the police. Moreover, Judge 
Fukushima himself was known to be a YLA member; who could doubt 
that other YLA judges might issue similar decisions that threatened the 
stability of Japan’s political order?  
As conservative politicians turned the focus of their anger toward the 
YLA, the judicial bureaucracy serving under Chief Justice Ishida 
considered an appropriate response. The natural place to begin an attack 
on the YLA was within the Supreme Court bureaucracy itself. It was 
discovered that, of fifteen assistant judges assigned to work in Supreme 
Court administration, no fewer than ten were YLA members. All of them 
resigned in January 1970 under pressure from senior judges.
81
 Then, on 
April 1, 1970, the Supreme Court denied judicial appointments to three 
graduates of the Legal Research and Training Institute, including two 
YLA members.
82
 One week later, the head of the Supreme Court 
secretariat issued a public statement declaring that judges should avoid 
membership in organizations with ―political coloration.‖83 (This 
individual, Kishi Morikazu, would be appointed to the Supreme Court one 
year later, on April 2, 1971.)  
The YLA controversy continued into 1971. Political pressure to reign 
in the judges led to further calls for action at the annual meeting of the 
 
 
 79. Whether the YLA should be described as ―leftist,‖ ―liberal,‖ or by some other politicized 
term, is a matter of personal preference. The same conservative ruling elite that attacked the YLA 
during this period has also viewed Japan’s democratic Constitution itself as unacceptable and has 
demanded revision, including dilution of individual rights, throughout the postwar era. As of this 
writing, the YLA continues to be a thriving organization of lawyers committed to preserving 
constitutional rights. See JAPAN YOUNG LAW. ASS’N ATT’Y & ACAD. SEC., http://www.seihokyo.jp/ 
(last visited May 9, 2011). Professor Miyazawa has described the organization as follows: ―The 
organization was established in 1954 by approximately 280 young lawyers including some ten judges . 
. . . Its main purpose was the promotion of ideals expressed in the present Constitution. The YLA 
recruited new members from trainees at the Judicial Research and Training Institute. Eventually, a 
pattern emerged in which approximately one third of the new assistant judges joined the YLA every 
year.‖ Miyazawa, supra note 56, at 55 (citation omitted). The founding members included many elite 
members of Japan’s legal community including two scholars who would later be appointed presidents 
of the University of Tokyo.  
 80. Ode, Background, supra note 50, at 137. 
 81. Id. at 154. 
 82. FUKUSHIMA CHRONOLOGY, supra note 50, at 1–10.  
 83. Professor Miyazawa reports on the April 8, 1970, statement by Supreme Court secretariat 
chief Kishi. Miyazawa, supra note 56, at 55–56. The Chief Justice repeated the point in comments 
published three weeks later on Constitution Day (May 3). ―Extreme nationalists, militarists, and 
anarchists, and clear communists are morally undesirable as judges.‖ Id.  
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ruling LDP, held in January 1971.
84
 Supreme Court administrators 
huddled to consider further measures. In March, the Court took the highly 
unusual step of denying a standard reappointment to an assistant judge 
named Miyamoto Yasuaki who had successfully completed his initial ten-
year term of service. Miyamoto was a YLA member. The Court also 
rejected the applications for judicial appointments of seven graduates of 
the Legal Research and Training Institute who were identified as members 
or supporters of the YLA. This action and other pressure from judicial 
administrators resulted in the resignation of nearly all member judges from 
the organization.
85
  
F. Reallocation of a Reserved Seat and a Sharp Change of Direction 
(1971) 
Four weeks after the Court’s action to deny Miyamoto’s reappointment 
and initial judicial appointments to other YLA members, Justice Iimura 
Yoshimi, a former member of the Tokyo Bar Association, reached the 
Supreme Court retirement age of seventy. In the ordinary course, it was 
expected that he would be replaced by another career attorney. But this 
time was different. For his replacement, the Sato administration selected a 
career prosecutor named Amano Buichi, then serving as the Chief 
Prosecutor in the Osaka High Court. Amano took office on May 21, 1971. 
His appointment raised the number of career prosecutors on the Court to 
two and reduced the number of career attorneys to four. This was a 
significant shift in the reserved seat system. 
Despite the formal allocation of appointment power to the Cabinet by 
the Constitution’s Article 79, research by Professors Haley, Law, and 
others indicates that the Chief Justice and his subordinates in the Supreme 
Court secretariat typically play a central role in selecting candidates for 
most seats on the Court.
86
 Observers have suggested that Chief Justice 
Ishida played an especially dominant role in appointments during his term. 
According to press accounts at the time, Ishida exercised so much 
influence that he was able to block appointments desired by the Sato 
Cabinet in favor of his own close associates.
87
 In the highly politicized 
atmosphere of the early 1970s, conservative politicians demanded a 
 
 
 84. FUKUSHIMA CHRONOLOGY, supra note 57, at 7. 
 85. Miyazawa, supra note 56, at 56. 
 86. See Haley, supra note 3, at 107; Law, supra note 2, at 1550–51.  
 87. David J. Danelski, The Political Impact of the Japanese Supreme Court, 49 NOTRE DAME 
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Supreme Court that would take a hard line against political demonstrators 
and other foes of the government. This attitude was shared by the Chief 
Justice.
88
 The selection of justices appointed in this era reflected this 
demand.  
The Court’s new conservative hue would be displayed most 
prominently in a number of Grand Bench decisions curtailing political 
speech by government employees and political demonstrators. The first of 
these was decided by a vote of 8–7 and effectively overruled several recent 
Grand Bench precedents, including one only four years old. The 
appointment of Amano and other conservatives during the term of Chief 
Justice Ishida made the difference. 
G. The Zennorin Decision (April 25, 1973) 
The case that would mark a turn of the tides arose out of mass protests 
against a bill submitted to the Diet in 1958 that would expand police 
powers to restrain demonstrators. Union leaders feared that passage of the 
law would lead to suppression of the union movement. The General 
Council of Trade Unions (Sohyo) led mass protests on November 5, 1958, 
joined by an estimated four million workers nationwide. In coordination 
with these demonstrations, the leadership of the All Japan Agriculture and 
Forestry Workers Union (Zennorin) issued a directive to members 
employed at the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, calling on them to 
attend an on-the-job rally from 10 a.m. to 11:40 a.m. and not to report to 
work until the afternoon. About 3000 members complied.
89
 
On the following day, police teams arrested union president Tsuruzono 
Tetsuo and twenty other officers and members of Zennorin. After 
interrogation, most suspects were released without charge. Tsuruzono and 
four colleagues, however, were indicted for violation of Article 95(5) of 
the National Public Employees Law (NPEL).
90
 The trial court found all 
defendants not guilty. After a government appeal, a panel of the Tokyo 
High Court found the defendants guilty and imposed fines of 50,000 yen 
 
 
 88. Professor Miyazawa provides a succinct description of the relationship between Chief Justice 
Ishida and his political sponsors: ―I should note, however, that there was also an element within the 
judiciary that shared the perspective of conservative politicians and actively responded to their 
expectations. The case in point is Justice Ishida who headed the Supreme Court from 1969 to 1973, 
exactly when the judiciary was under the strongest pressure from conservative politicians.‖ Miyazawa, 
supra note 56, at 57. 
 89. For a summary of the facts, see BEER & ITOH, supra note 71, at 244. 
 90. 2 YAMAMOTO, supra note 20, at 119. 
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each, with no prison time. This decision was appealed to the Supreme 
Court in October 1968.  
Under Tokyo Teachers Union and the other recent Grand Bench 
precedents described above, the petitioners might have expected that 
criminal prosecution for their actions would be barred and the cases 
dismissed. But the Court had changed. In a Grand Bench decision issued 
by the remodeled Court on April 25, 1973, Chief Justice Ishida and his 
colleagues rejected the approach of Tokyo Teachers Union and other 
recent decisions.
91
 The Court declared that activities prohibited by the 
NPEL could not be divided between acts of greater or lesser illegality or 
acts meriting or not meriting criminal punishment. Although the Court 
recognized that basic worker rights of public employees are protected by 
Article 28 of the Constitution, it approved prosecutions for even minor 
infractions accompanied by no threat of violence or disorder. The Court 
justified these prosecutions ―from the standpoint of the collective interest 
of all the people‖ (kokumin zentai no kyodo rieki).92 Under this abstract 
standard, the government was again free to arrest, detain, and prosecute 
union leaders for even minor infractions. The Tanaka Cabinet immediately 
issued a statement lauding the Court’s action and warning leaders of 
public service unions that if they took any action violating the new 
standard, the government would take severe countermeasures (―gensei na 
taido de taisho suru‖).93  
As summarized by the eminent constitutional scholar Ashibe 
Nobuyoshi, ―In this decision we see a shift in the Court, with the minority 
opinion in the 1969 decision becoming the majority opinion in Zennorin. 
With much debate, this case drastically changed the course of 
constitutional law in Japan.‖94  
H. Completion of the Post-Ishida Reserved Seat System (1973) 
Although the Ishida Court had achieved its objective in the Zennorin 
case, the remodeling of the Court was not yet complete. By the time the 
 
 
 91. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 25, 1973, 27 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHU [KEISHŪ] 
547 (Tsuruzono v. Japan). An English translation of the court opinion appears in BEER & ITOH, supra 
note 71, at 244–86. 
 92. Professor Beer provides concise factual descriptions of the case. BEER, supra note 47, at 
235–36. 
 93. 2 YAMAMOTO, supra note 20, at 142. 
 94. Ashibe Nobuyoshi et al., Japan: The United States Constitution and Japan’s Constitutional 
Law (William B. Cleary trans.), in CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS IN LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY ASIA 
224, 245–46 (Lawrence W. Beer ed., 1992).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1738 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88:1713 
 
 
 
 
Zennorin decision was released on April 25, 1973, two of the dissenters, 
Justices Irokawa Kotaro and Tanaka Jiro, were no longer on the Court. 
Irokawa had reached retirement age in January 1973. He was an Osaka 
lawyer who was generally recognized as a leader of the Court’s liberal 
wing. When his replacement was announced, there was another surprise—
this time the Tanaka Cabinet did follow reserved seat custom and select an 
attorney, but the man they chose was a big surprise. Established custom 
required that the Japan Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA) prepare and 
submit a short list of attorney candidates for the Court and that the Cabinet 
(in consultation with the Chief Justice) select one for appointment. This 
time, the Cabinet ignored the list of candidates recommended by the JFBA 
and appointed an attorney of its own choosing instead, a conservative 
named Otsuka Kiichiro. Otsuka ascended to Irokawa’s place on the Court 
on April 2, 1973. The attorneys had retained this seat on the Court, but 
they lost their voice in selecting the person who would fill it.
95
 
Meanwhile, apparently in disgust at the sharp turn of events, another 
leader of the Court’s liberal wing, Justice Tanaka Jiro, resigned that spring 
at the age of sixty-seven, three years before his term would expire.
96
 When 
appointed to the Court, Tanaka was an eminent scholar of administrative 
law at the University of Tokyo. As noted above, Tanaka had been 
considered a leading candidate to become Chief Justice. If he had been 
appointed, the development of constitutional protection for individual 
rights would likely have taken another course. After losing this contest to 
Ishida in 1969, Tanaka continued to soldier on as an associate justice. But 
when he saw the accomplishments of Tokyo Teachers Union and other 
cases overturned by the Zennorin decision, Tanaka chose to leave the 
Court.  
With Tanaka’s retirement, the reserved seat system was adjusted once 
more. He was replaced not by an academic like himself, but by a 
bureaucrat. The new justice was Takatsuji Masami, whose prior position 
was head of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, an office charged with vetting 
government legislative proposals.
97
 Now the restructuring of the Court was 
complete. When Ishida took office as Chief Justice in January 1969, Court 
membership included six judges, five lawyers, one prosecutor, two 
 
 
 95. According to Yamamoto, the JFBA submitted a list of nine candidates. The Tanaka Cabinet 
rejected all in order to appoint Ohtsuka. 2 YAMAMOTO, supra note 20, at 129–30.  
 96. Id. at 130–32. 
 97. Professor Kamiya Masako’s Supreme Court Appointments chart provides an invaluable tool 
to track appointments. See Masako Kamiya, ―Chōsakan‖: Research Judges Toiling at the Stone 
Fortress, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1601 (2011). 
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professors, and one bureaucrat, a lineup that was quite similar to the one 
appointed to the first Supreme Court in 1947. During his term as Chief 
Justice, eleven justices retired and were replaced. When Ishida retired in 
May 1973, the lineup was six judges, four attorneys, two prosecutors, one 
professor, and two bureaucrats. The attorneys and academics had lost two 
seats, and career government officials had gained two. 
There is no doubt that the shift in seats away from attorneys and 
academics was a key element in a highly political decision calculated to 
change the ideological balance of the Court and to achieve specific 
outcomes in politically sensitive cases. Attorneys like Irokawa and 
academics like Tanaka Jiro were viewed as ideological foes by the LDP 
politicians of the time and by Supreme Court Justices like Ishida who 
shared the views of their political sponsors. Ishida and the LDP Cabinets 
in power during his term used the appointment power to ensure that 
individuals with liberal political beliefs like Irokawa and Tanaka would no 
longer have significant influence on the Court.
98
 
I. The Sarufutsu Decision and the End of Strict Scrutiny (November 6, 
1974) 
The Court’s hard turn to the right was exemplified by a Grand Bench 
decision issued a year after Zennorin in the so-called ―Sarufutsu‖ case.99 
Against the dissents of four remaining liberal justices, the Court 
overturned lower court judgments in three separate cases that had 
acquitted government employees charged with violating the NPEL by 
exercising various forms of political speech. In all cases, the defendants 
were acting in support of political foes of the government. In one case, the 
defendant was prosecuted for acting as a master of ceremonies and 
delivering a speech at an election rally for a Communist candidate for the 
Diet. In another, four national government employees were arrested and 
charged for handing out leaflets listing local assembly candidates 
supported by their union. In the third, which arose in the village of 
Sarufutsu in Hokkaido, the defendant was indicted because he put up ―six 
posters on a public bulletin board during off-duty hours and mailed the 
same flyer to some friends, asking them to post it in public.‖100 Lower 
 
 
 98. Sato Eisaku was replaced as prime minister by another LDP politician, Tanaka Kakuei, on 
July 7, 1972. 
 99. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 6, 1974, 28 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 
393 (Japan v. Osawa). An English translation of the court opinions appears in BEER & ITOH, supra 
note 71, at 522. 
 100. BEER, supra note 47, at 236. 
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courts in all three cases held that the defendants’ activities were protected 
by the free speech provision of the Constitution and that therefore the 
prosecutions were unconstitutional.  
The Court overturned all of these acquittals in judgments issued on 
November 6, 1974. In the Sarufutsu judgment, the Court held that, despite 
the free speech guarantee in the Constitution, prosecution of these 
individuals was appropriate because ―the parliamentary system requires 
that public employees carry out policies passed into law by the Diet and 
that they maintain political neutrality in order to keep the trust of the 
people in the political impartiality of government administration.‖ In order 
to ―keep the trust of the people,‖ the Court upheld a complete ban on 
political activities by all workers subject to the NPEL and universal 
prosecution not only for violation of the Law itself, but also for violation 
of administrative regulations issued thereunder.  
Professor Ashibe explains that prior to the Sarufutsu decision, many 
lower courts had adopted a ―strict scrutiny‖ doctrine requiring the state to 
show that it had used the ―least restrictive alternative‖ (commonly referred 
to as the ―LRA standard‖ in Japan) in restricting speech. The Sarufutsu 
decision, which ―overturned the lower courts’ decisions and held that a 
complete and uniform ban on political activities was constitutional,‖101 
stopped this movement in its tracks.  
Professor Ashibe’s devastating critique labeled the Court’s approach 
―formalistic and nominal balancing.‖ By employing this technique, he 
explains, the Court need not consider such facts as the  
concrete circumstances of the employees, such as job 
classifications, the varied nature of their responsibilities and the 
difference between times on and off the job. . . . In this way of 
thinking, ―the collective benefit of all the people gained by this ban‖ 
outweighs the benefits lost by the merely ―indirect and incidental 
restraint on freedoms to express opinions.‖ The former is ―more 
important‖ than the latter in the balance of interests.102  
Although the Court professes to accord special protection to free 
speech rights, ―even if there is no concrete danger of and no actual 
occurrence of an infringement of the legislative purpose, sanctions against 
any rule violation are permissible simply due to an abstract danger.‖103  
 
 
 101. Ashibe et al., supra note 94, at 255. 
 102. Id. at 254. 
 103. Id. at 254–55. 
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Professor Ashibe’s assessment of the impact of the Sarufutsu decision 
is widely shared among Japan’s constitutional law scholars. According to 
Professor Yasuhiro Okudaira, ―[f]rom the time this decision was issued 
until the present, it (the Sarufutsu decision) continues to be regarded 
among constitutional scholars as one of the Court’s worst judgments.‖104 
Ashibe summarizes the impact of Sarufutsu as follows: ―This decision has 
had a major impact on the course of constitutional litigation dealing with 
rights and freedoms of the spirit of Japan. It is not an exaggeration to say 
that this case marked a turning point in the history of Japan’s 
constitutional case law.‖105 
With its 1973 Zennorin ruling, the Court succeeded in criminalizing a 
wide range of labor protest activities by millions of government workers. 
With its 1974 Sarufutsu ruling, it prohibited all national government 
workers from exercising any form of political speech at all, other than the 
act of voting itself.  
In another Grand Bench judgment issued a year later, the Court 
continued to weave a tight web of restraints to bind the exercise of 
political speech in public forums. This time, the Court overruled 
judgments by the Tokushima District and Takamatsu High Courts in 
which those courts found a local ordinance that strictly regulated political 
demonstrations to be unconstitutional.  
J. The Tokushima Decision and the Regulation of Public Demonstrations 
(September 10, 1975) 
This case concerned a December 1968 antiwar demonstration involving 
about 300 individuals in the city of Tokushima on the island of Shikoku. 
According to facts recognized by the Court, ―the lead group snake-danced 
in the street and engaged in activities contrary to the maintenance of traffic 
order. The defendant himself snake-danced and, from a position apart from 
the front line, raised both his arms, waved them back and forth, and blew a 
whistle he had in his possession.‖106 By these actions, the courts concluded 
that the defendant had incited other marchers to snake-dance and thereby 
disrupt traffic.  
 
 
 104. Okudaira Yasuhiro, Ima futatabi odokasareru hyogen no jiyu (Once again under threat—
freedom of expression) 46 (Hogaku Seminar no. 615, March 2006). 
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The defendant was arrested and indicted on charges of violating the 
Road Traffic Law, a national statute, and the Tokushima Public Safety 
Ordinance, a regulation adopted by the legislative assembly of Tokushima 
Prefecture. The relevant language of the Public Safety Ordinance 
empowered the police to impose restrictions against actions that might 
endanger ―the maintenance of traffic order.‖ Both the district court and 
high courts found the defendant not guilty of violating the Tokushima 
Public Safety Ordinance on the ground that the language of the ordinance 
was ―general, abstract, and ambiguous.‖ According to these courts, 
wording of the ordinance did not possess sufficient clarity to enable 
individuals to make reasonable judgments concerning what actions might 
constitute a crime punishable under the Ordinance.
107
 Accordingly, they 
held that the Ordinance was unconstitutionally vague under the 
Constitution’s Article 31 and found the defendant not guilty on this 
count.
108
 
By a vote of 10–5, a Grand Bench judgment issued on September 10, 
1975, overturned these judgments and found the defendant guilty.
109
 The 
Supreme Court reasoning in this case presents an interesting puzzle. The 
Court appeared to agree with critical findings of the lower courts: first, the 
Grand Bench opinion recognized that the actions of the defendant in this 
case constitute the exercise of political speech protected by the 
Constitution; second, the opinion agreed that language in the Ordinance 
was vague. On the first point, the Court wrote that ―as one form of 
expression, mass demonstrations possess elements worthy of 
constitutional protection,‖ and ―we must not deprive mass demonstrations 
of their essential meaning and value as expressions of ideas and thereby 
improperly restrain the freedom of expression guaranteed by the 
Constitution.‖ On the second point, the Court recognized that the phrase 
―the maintenance of traffic order‖ as used in the Ordinance ―is certainly 
open to the criticism that its language is abstract.‖ Nonetheless, because 
―an average person of ordinary common sense‖ would be able to judge 
―whether his conduct will create an interference with public safety of the 
kind which accompanies mass demonstrations carried out in a calm and 
 
 
 107. Id. at 551. 
 108. Id. The Constitution’s Article 31 provides that ―[n]o person shall be deprived of life or 
liberty, nor shall any other criminal penalty be imposed, except according to procedure established by 
law.‖ NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 31. 
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orderly manner, or will yield intentional interference with traffic order,‖110 
the Court dismissed the claim of unconstitutional vagueness. By imposing 
the requirement that individuals respect an unwritten ―reasonable man‖ 
standard or face prosecution, it appears that the Court does not require 
clear language in criminal statutes. 
CONCLUSION 
The landmark decisions in the Zennorin, Sarufutsu, and Tokushima 
cases all overturned fresh Supreme Court precedent or acquittals involving 
defendants engaged in political speech. It is difficult to imagine a more 
sudden and momentous shift against the interests of a large class of 
individuals who might seek to communicate their political beliefs to 
fellow citizens. Within the span of just a few years, the remodeled 
Supreme Court of Japan succeeded in overturning several critical lower 
court judgments that had upheld different aspects of the right to free 
speech. Under the leadership of Chief Justice Ishida and other Justices 
appointed during this era, the Court reversed the flow of constitutional 
doctrine in Japan.  
The evidence clearly shows that the Sato and Tanaka administrations 
took advantage of their appointment power to change the ideological 
direction of the Supreme Court. Adjustment of the ―reserved seat‖ system 
by increasing the seats allocated to career prosecutors and bureaucrats and 
decreasing the number allocated to attorneys and scholars was a critical 
feature. The formula established during this era—featuring six seats to 
career judges, two seats to career prosecutors, and two more to career 
bureaucrats—remains in effect today. This means that lifetime government 
employees hold a commanding ten-to-five majority on the Grand Bench, 
along with majorities on each of the three petty benches.  
The political confrontations of the 1960s and 1970s led to demands for 
a tough response from Japan’s conservative political leaders. The 
restructured Supreme Court delivered. Key precedents from this era, 
including Zennorin, Sarufutsu, and Tokushima, would be followed by 
courts throughout the country. They remain in effect today. Future 
majorities of the Supreme Court would stand for the new conservative 
order. The result is that today, three-and-a-half decades later, Japan’s 
Supreme Court has yet to find a single instance in which an action of the 
police or any other government agency has ever infringed the right to free 
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speech or other ―freedoms of the spirit‖ declared in Japan’s 
Constitution.
111
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